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Christopher Watkin
Michel Serres: From Restricted  
to General Ecology
Abstract: Michel Serres’s relation to ecocriticism is complex. On the one hand, he is a pion-
eer in the area, anticipating the current fashion for ecological thought by over a decade. 
On the other hand, ‘ecology’ and ‘eco-criticism’ are singularly infelicitous terms to describe 
Serres’s thinking if they are taken to indicate that attention should be paid to particular 
‘environmental’ concerns. For Serres, such local, circumscribed ideas as ‘ecology’ or ‘eco-
philosophy’ are one of the causes of our ecological crisis, and no progress can be made 
while such narrow concerns govern our thinking. This chapter intervenes in the ongoing 
discussion about the relation of Serres to ecology by drawing on some of Serres’s more 
recent texts on pollution and dwelling, and this fresh material leads us to modulate existing 
treatments of Serres and ecology. I insist on the inextricability of two senses of ecology in 
Serres’s approach: a broader meaning that refers to the interconnectedness and inextricabil-
ity of all entities (natural and cultural, material and ideal), and a narrower sense that evokes 
classically ‘environmental’ concerns. Serres’s recent work leads us to challenge some of the 
vectors and assumptions of the debate by radicalising the continuity between ‘natural’ and 
‘cultural’ phenomena, questioning some of the commonplaces that structure almost all 
ecological thinking, and arguing that the entire paradigm of ecology as ‘conservation’ and 
‘protection’ is bankrupt and self-undermining. After outlining the shape of Serres’s ‘gen-
eral ecology’ and its opposition to ecology as conservation, this chapter asks what sorts of 
practices and values a Serresian general ecology can engender when it considers birdsong, 
advertising, industrial pollution and money to be manifestations of the same drive for ap-
propriation through pollution. A response is given in terms of three key Serresian motifs: 
the world as fetish, parasitic symbiosis, and global cosmocracy.
Michel Serres’s relation to ecocriticism is complex. On the one hand, he is a pion-
eer in the area, anticipating the current fashion for ecological thought by over a 
decade. He was thinking deeply and at length about ecological issues at a time 
when few others cared to address the subject: ‘I was one of the first, if not the first, 
to make ecology not just a matter of fundamental urgency but above all a philo-
sophical and even metaphysical question’.1 When we engage with Michel Serres’s 
ecological thought, we are not simply reading a reaction to a recent critical trend, 
much less jumping on a modish bandwagon. This links to a wider point of crucial 
1 Michel Serres, Pantopie: de Hermès à Petite Poucette (Paris: Le Pommier, 2014), 62 
[hereafter P; my translation].
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importance for understanding Michel Serres as an ecological thinker, since much 
ecological rhetoric – from philosophers and politicians – is reactive, seeking to 
respond to changes and problems, always on the back foot, always fighting a los-
ing battle to ‘protect’ and ‘conserve’. Eschewing this responsive paradigm, Serres’s 
thought offers a larger ecological vision that can set a positive agenda for change. 
His proactive stance is driven by the question that he chooses to ask: whereas 
much ecological thought asks the question ‘how?’ (how do we reduce emissions? 
How should we think of ‘nature’ differently? How do we ‘save the planet’?), Serres 
insists on the deeper question ‘why?’ – why do we pollute? ‘What do we really want 
when we dirty the world?’.2
On the other hand, ‘ecology’ and ‘eco-criticism’ are infelicitous terms for de-
scribing Serres’s thinking if they are taken to indicate that attention should be 
paid only to particular objects (trees, animals, rivers) or questions (climate change, 
deforestation). For Serres, such local, circumscribed ideas as ‘ecology’ or ‘eco-phi-
losophy’ are one of the causes of the ‘ecological crisis’, and no progress can be 
made while such narrow concerns govern our thinking. His work abounds with 
themes that would commonly be filed under ‘ecology’, but if he uses the term 
relatively little in his writing it is because of his fundamental conviction that it is 
impossible to isolate a set of discrete ideas under this label. As for the ‘criticism’ in 
‘eco-criticism’, the notion has a very unfavourable reputation in Serres’s thinking. 
The academic culture of critique and criticism that produces one commentary 
after another has become an impotent and stale exercise in repetition,3 and with 
Le Parasite [The Parasite] (1980) Serres turned his back for good on academic 
criticism and traditional university discourse (EHP 98). 
Any attempt to evaluate Serres in relation to ecocriticism must therefore find 
a way to negotiate these two problems, namely that his thought resists becoming 
narrowly ecological, and that he eschews the culture of critique. If we allow Serres 
to challenge and rethink what we might mean by ‘ecocriticism’, we find that he 
provides us with a deep and robust reframing of ecological thought, and a proac-
tive ecological political agenda. 
Among the scandalously sparse secondary literature on Serres, ecology is one of 
the themes that has received a comparatively thorough treatment. As we embark 
on the current study, it is helpful to survey salient perspectives on his work. Often 
2 Michel Serres, Le Mal propre: polluer pour s’approprier? (Paris: Le Pommier, 2008), 
57 [hereafter LMP]; Malfeasance: Appropriation through Pollution?, trans. by A.-M. 
Feenberg-Dibon (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 40 [hereafter M].
3 Michel Serres and Luc Abraham, ‘Un entretien avec Michel Serres’, Horizons philo-
sophiques 10.2 (2000), 97–116 (99; 105) [hereafter EHP].
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at stake in discussions of Serres as an ecological thinker has been the relation 
between a broad sense of ‘ecology’ as general interconnectedness of all knowledge 
and all fields of inquiry, and a more specific sense pertaining specifically to the 
‘natural’ world. This distinction is brought into play by Sydney Lévy in his intro-
duction to a special edition of the journal SubStance (1997) on Serres’s ecological 
thinking. Lévy frames his understanding of ‘ecology’ in terms of Serresian inter-
disciplinarity, tracing ‘local, tenuous, perilous’ passages between different fields.4 
Of particular note in the issue is Paul A. Harris’s ‘The Itinerant Theorist’, in which 
Harris elegantly articulates the broader and narrower senses of ecology in his 
contention that ‘Serres attempts to evoke an intimate, visceral knowledge of nature 
in order to redefine the nature of knowledge’, in what Harris terms a Serresian 
‘cultural ecology’.5 Both the natural world and the universe of knowledge are to 
be thought, analogously, as complex open systems of interconnection that do not 
sacrifice the empirical and material on the altar of the general and the abstract.
In her doctoral thesis (2003), Stephanie Posthumus evokes the relation between 
the broader and narrower senses of ecology in her discussion of Serres’s ecological 
thought. She unfolds the broader sense through careful studies of the motifs of 
structures6 and réseaux7 [webs] in Serres’s thought, arguing that the author of Le 
Contrat Naturel [The Natural Contract] (1990) is elaborating his eco-philosophy 
(in the narrower sense) in terms of his ‘vision interconnectée du monde [intercon-
nected vision of the world]’,8 while refusing to identify with narrowly ecological 
concerns.9 Making a finer set of distinctions within the two categories of ‘broad’ 
and ‘narrow’ ecologies,10 Posthumus distinguishes between the academic discourse 
of ‘scientific ecology’, the ‘ecological consciousness’ that names a mere awareness 
of ecological concerns, and the ‘ecologism’ that takes action on the basis of those 
concerns. She further differentiates between the ‘ecophilosophy’ of Serres’s more 
theoretical texts, the ‘ecopoetics’ of his treatments of literature, and the ‘ecopolitics’ 
4 Sydney Lévy, ‘Introduction: An Ecology of Knowledge: Michel Serres’, SubStance 26.2 
(1997), 3–5 (3).
5 Paul A. Harris, ‘The Itinerant Theorist: Nature and Knowledge/Ecology and Topology 
in Michel Serres’, SubStance 26.2 (1997), 37–58 (39; 44).
6 Stephanie Posthumus, ‘La Nature et l’écologie chez Lévi-Strauss, Tournier, Serres’ (PhD 
thesis, University of Western Ontario, 2003), 71–100.
7 Posthumus, ‘La Nature et l’écologie’, 186–99.
8 Posthumus, ‘La Nature et l’écologie’, 194 [unreferenced translations are mine].
9 Posthumus, ‘La Nature et l’écologie’, 221.
10 The terms ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ are mine, not Posthumus’s.
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of The Natural Contract and Hominescence, concluding that the three ecologies 
are almost impossible to isolate from each other.11
In the article ‘Translating Ecocriticism’ (2007), Posthumus develops her Ser-
resian insights, using them to shine a light on some of the shortcomings of an-
glophone ecocriticism in terms of five themes: ecology; science; nature; language; 
humanity. Through a threefold insistence on 1) the inextricability of the broader 
and narrower senses of ecology in Serres’s eco-philosophy, 2) his affirmation 
of humanism in an ecological context, and 3) the refusal of ecology – in the 
broader sense – to distinguish between ‘natural’ and ‘cultural’ interconnected-
ness, Posthumus is able to offer Serresian thought as a corrective to some of the 
more unreflective Romantic sensibilities of anglophone ecocriticism. The Natural 
Contract, she insists, ‘is not a call to get back to nature, to a less technological way 
of life’,12 but encompasses a broader idea of ‘living together’13 in a way that cuts 
across the nature-culture divide. Serres’s usefulness for ecocriticism, according 
to Posthumus, is manifold: he offers ‘exactly what a new generation of ecocrit-
ics has been looking for as a way to combine both an urbancare and earthcare 
politics’;14 his Grand Récit [Great Story] of the universe helps us ‘avoid an all or 
nothing attitude towards scientific discourse’;15 he helps cultivate scientific literacy 
within ecocriticism;16 his rejection of linguistic philosophy and his insistence on 
the empirically encountered material world offers ecocriticism ‘a foundation for 
reasserting a materialized language in a literary world’;17 he helps us think the 
global ‘without erasing local differences’;18 he ‘presents us with a field of literary 
texts that would otherwise be excluded from a strictly nature-oriented ecocritical 
approach’.19
In ‘Vers une écocritique française’ (2011), Posthumus returns to the shortcom-
ings of anglophone ecological thought, the monolingualism of ecocriticism, and 
its neglect of literature. Setting Serres in opposition to an Anglo-Saxon ‘return to 
11 Posthumus, ‘La Nature et l’écologie’, 229.
12 Stephanie Posthumus, ‘Translating Ecocriticism: Dialoguing with Michel Serres’, Re-
construction 7.2 (2007), 37 paragraphs, <http://reconstruction.eserver.org/Issues/072/
posthumus.shtml> [accessed 27 May 2016], paragraph 11.
13 Posthumus, ‘Translating Ecocriticism’, paragraph 12.
14 Posthumus, ‘Translating Ecocriticism’, paragraph 12.
15 Posthumus, ‘Translating Ecocriticism’, paragraph 17.
16 Posthumus, ‘Translating Ecocriticism’, paragraph 18.
17 Posthumus, ‘Translating Ecocriticism’, paragraph 28.
18 Posthumus, ‘Translating Ecocriticism’, paragraph 35.
19 Posthumus, ‘Translating Ecocriticism’, paragraph 37.
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nature’ – which, Serres insists, would merely spell the victory of town over coun-
try20 – she argues that ecocriticism must be able to yield an ecological politics,21 
which is precisely what Serres’s natural contract provides. Once more, she insists 
that (narrowly) ecological themes cannot adequately be addressed apart from a 
(broad) ecological way of thinking that embraces all fields of knowledge,22 and 
that prevents The Natural Contract from being reduced to a thesis on environ-
mentalism.
The present chapter intervenes in this ongoing conversation by bringing some 
of Serres’s more recent texts into the limelight.23 This fresh material leads us to 
affirm, and to challenge, existing treatments of Serres and ecology. I affirm the 
insistence on the inextricability of the narrower and broader senses of ‘ecology’ 
(which I call ‘restricted’ and ‘general’ ecology) in Serres’s approach, but the new 
material leads me to challenge some of the vectors and assumptions of the debate 
by radicalising the continuity between ‘natural’ and ‘cultural’ phenomena, ques-
tioning some of the commonplaces that structure almost all ecological thinking, 
and arguing that the entire paradigm of ecology as ‘conservation’ and ‘protection’ 
is bankrupt and self-undermining.
Towards a general ecology
The proposal for a ‘natural contract’ remains Serres’s most widely known contribu-
tion to ecological thought, narrowly conceived. Though Serres seeks to avoid the 
label ‘ecological’, it is not quite correct to say that the natural contract has nothing 
to do with ecology. In an interview included in Pantopie [Pantopia] (2014), he 
20 Stephanie Posthumus, ‘Vers une écocritique française: le contrat naturel de Michel 
Serres’, Mosaic 44.2 (2011), 85–100 (88).
21 Posthumus, ‘Vers une écocritique française’, 90.
22 Posthumus, ‘Vers une écocritique française’, 91.
23 The discussion will interact mainly with the work usually considered to be Serres’s 
most ‘ecological’: Le Contrat naturel (Paris: Bourin, 1990) [hereafter LCN]. In addi-
tion to this common reference, I will explore the impact on the debate around Serres 
and ecology: La Guerre mondiale (Paris: Le Pommier, 2008) [hereafter GM]; Biogée 
(Paris: Le Pommier, 2010) [hereafter B]; Habiter (Paris: Le Pommier, 2011) [hereafter 
H]. My reflections are informed by interviews in which Serres clarifies his arguments: 
Michel Serres and Clés, ‘Michel Serres: “Nous traversons la plus importante mutation 
depuis la préhistoire!”’, Clés (2014), <http://www.cles.com/enquetes/article/michel-
serres-nous-traversons-la-plus-importante-mutation-depuis-la-prehistoire> [accessed 
27 May 2016]; Michel Serres and Pouvoirs, ‘Entretien avec Michel Serres: le droit peut 
sauver la nature’, Pouvoirs 127 (2008), 5–12. 
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expands on his aversion to the ecological in a way that helps us to gain a better 
appreciation of how he situates his own natural contract:
You have proposed a ‘natural contract’. Was this a foray into ecology [une démarche éco-
logiste] on your part? 
No, certainly not. I have studiously avoided the term. There is a confusion today around 
the word ‘ecology’ between its use by politicians and by scientists. In political discourse, 
ecology is the ethical concern to keep nature – understood as a virgin and wild species –  
protected against human violation. In science, ecology (oikos-logos – knowledge of the 
milieu, of the habitat) is a different thing altogether. The biologist Ernst Haeckel defined 
it at the end of the nineteenth century as a very sophisticated science that tries to gather 
together all the geological, chemical, biological, vegetal and animal interactions that 
constitute a milieu – for example, the biotope of Mont Ventoux. (P 233–6 [my translation])
The two senses of ecology here are in direct opposition: the first, restricted sense 
reinforces the dichotomies of a thoroughly human politics and a wild or unkempt 
nature, or of human environmental damage in opposition to a virgin or unspoiled 
world; the second sense seeks to find links, dependencies and passages between 
all of the entities in a given milieu, travelling across dichotomies and back again. 
While Serres does not write about ecology in the first, restricted sense, his thought 
is most certainly ecological in the second sense – insisting on links and continu-
ities across apparent divisions and differences.
The most fruitful way to understand Serres’s contribution to ecology in the 
aforementioned narrow, political sense must necessarily pass through his elabo-
ration of an ecology in the broader, scientific sense. I introduce the term ‘general 
ecology’ to describe this latter ecology in Serresian thought, proceeding as it does 
not by drawing distinctions and creating oppositions in the spirit of academic 
‘criticism’, but by seeking translations and equivalences between seemingly dis-
parate areas of thought or domains of existence. 
Malfeasance: is everything ecological?
The radical subversion of dichotomies in Serres’s general ecology is shown more 
clearly through specific examples than through abstract discussion, and adopting 
an approach that foregrounds particular instances of general ecology will help to 
clarify how Serres forces us to understand the world differently, refusing to set 
the ‘natural’ world and human action against each other, and forcing us to revisit 
aspects of our world and society that we do not commonly associate with ecologi-
cal concerns. Taking the lead from Malfeasance, and incorporating discussions of 
other key ecological texts, we shall see how Serres frames the phenomenon of 
pollution not as something utterly foreign and alien to non-human ecology, but as 
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something fundamentally in continuity with it. If Serres is correct in this regard, 
we must recognise that the great majority of our environmentalism is built on an 
assumption that actively hampers clear ecological understanding and intervention. 
Serres approaches the phenomenon of pollution not by asking how it can be 
reduced, but why it is produced. He answers by arguing that it is only one instance 
of a universal desire, shared by humans and the non-human alike, to occupy space, 
and to make it unusable by others. Pollution, in short, is a mode of appropriation.24 
Understood as an action that fulfils the desire to occupy space, pollution can be 
seen alongside other territorial activities that cut across the customary divide 
between nature and culture: ‘just like animals, we sully the place we want to make 
into our own nest’.25 The tiger that urinates to mark its territory is engaging in 
an action qualitatively equivalent to the multinational corporation dumping its 
effluent. In micturating on its terrain, the tiger is merely asserting itself as ‘master 
and possessor’ of its lair (LMP 113; M 85). Although we have a curious tendency to 
assume that conventions of property are an exclusively human trait, Serres insists 
that animals also mark, possess and protect their property and goods (P 250). 
We may be tempted to dismiss pollution as an unfortunate and avoidable 
by-product of industrial processes, but Serres insists that to do so is to prevent 
ourselves from understanding its deep motivation, hence from addressing it in 
anything but a superficial way. At the very least, Serres is inviting us to reflect on 
whether we have misunderstood the meaning of pollution:26
When rich countries discharge their industrial waste in the mangroves of poor countries, 
are they not also seizing and re-colonising them? When, on the other hand, inhabitants 
of a place protest against its designation as a nuclear storage site, do they revolt against 
a medical risk or against a power exploiting the right to expropriate them? ‘We want to 
keep our own homes,’ they shout. (LMP 67; M 48)
Could it not be that in polluting we are exercising that deepest of human (and 
non-human) desires to appropriate a place in the world, or to appropriate the 
world itself?
24 In common with most Serresian themes, this idea does not emerge ex nihilo in its 
most developed form in Malfeasance. It is adumbrated in Le Parasite (Paris: Grasset & 
Fasquelle, 1980), Rome: le livre des fondations (Paris: Grasset & Fasquelle, 1983) and 
Statues: le second livre des fondations (Paris: Julliard, 1987).
25 Michel Serres, Rameaux (Paris: Le Pommier, 2004), 195 [hereafter R; my translation].
26 This interrogative mood is indicated by the question mark at the end of the book’s subtitle 
in English and French (Le Mal propre: polluer pour approprier?; Malfeasance: Appropria-
tion through Pollution?). The interrogative is a pedagogic tool, rather than a genuine doubt, 
as it is clear that Serres sees a Leibnizian translation from pollution to property.
Christopher Watkin160
Moving from the ‘hard’ (physical, material pollution) to the ‘soft’ (symbolic, 
informational, linguistic pollution), Serres finds a similar appropriation of space 
in the cacophony of multiple voices – in the choral hymns of a Greek tragedy, 
or – to take Steven Connor’s example – in the chants and songs of the home fans 
at an Arsenal football match.27 In such a sporting context, the noise generated by 
the crowd acts as a weapon, ‘a muniment of din to crush the opposing team’,28 and 
it is the vocal appropriation of space – more than the geographical location of the 
turf – that makes the fixture a ‘home’ tie. In this aggressive occupation of space, 
the baying crowd is obeying precisely the same logic as the songbird’s chirping 
(P 249–50) – likewise a strategy to occupy space – or the sound of a noisy aero-
plane, car or motorbike that rings out victory over the space that is occupied (LMP 
57; M 40). In both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ ways, pollution is the signature of the will to 
power (LMP 92; M 68).
Serres discerns another common structure between ‘natural’ and ‘cultural’ 
appropriations of space in his comparison between advertising campaigns and 
epidemics, both of which function as ‘machines à fabriquer de l’invasion [in-
vasion-making machines]’ (B 96) that spread ‘virally’. Corporations mark their 
products in the form of logos and brand names, harnessing all their consumers 
as willing co-workers charged with scattering their symbolic ordure (LMP 37–8; 
M 25) to demarcate their territory. As much as any form of pollution, advertising 
is about appropriating space – a point that Serres makes through rewriting Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s quotation on the origin of civil society:
The first one who, once he had measured out a plot, bought it to besmirch it with his brand 
so that it proclaimed: ‘this is mine and I am the best’, and who in fact found people naive 
enough to let him steal their view, and become his slaves, invented advertising. (LMP 70; 
M 50 [translation altered])
The paradigm of appropriation through pollution is also found in the ‘golden 
excrement’ of money – a proxy pollutant that serves to appropriate territory and 
goods just as effectively as sullying them (LMP 66–7; M 48). For Serres, ‘the pol-
luter pays’ is an evident tautology, mirroring the equivalence of money and excre-
ment (LMP 67; M 48) found in Freud’s discussion of the anal stage of development 
(EP 9). In the case of the carbon tax, a polluting appropriation covers and doubles 
another in a seamless emphasis: polluter pollutes. 
27 Steven K. Connor, ‘Play Grounds: The Arenas of Game’, StevenConnor.com (13 Febru-
ary 2008), <http://stevenconnor.com/playgrounds.html> [accessed 27 May 2016]; A 
Philosophy of Sport (London: Reaktion, 2011), 57.
28 Connor, ‘Play Grounds’; A Philosophy of Sport, 60.
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The same logic of appropriation through pollution similarly obtains in the ‘soft’ 
realm of language. Writing one’s signature is a way of sullying – thus taking owner-
ship of – a document or page, and language more broadly is a means of appropria-
tion: ‘can I now say, describe, show what I perceive? No; I have no language at my 
disposal to do this because all languages come from the networks through which I 
perceive the so-called real, and that prove there is nothing that cannot be said’ (LMP 
101; M 75). Pollution slips easily from the field to the book, from the hard to the soft, 
from the pagus – into which excrement is turned by the ploughing of oxen – to the 
pagina whose parallel lines of text mimic the agricultural furrow (LMP 35–6; M 23). 
Serres also sees a continuity between pollution and phenomenology. The presup-
positions in terms of which we perceive the world are sophisticated strategies of 
appropriation (LMP 100), what in another discourse might be called confirmation 
bias or the minimisation of cognitive dissonance. Thinking that we see and under-
stand things directly, what we encounter is already polluted as it passes through a 
series of appropriation strategies, such that one is unable to describe that which does 
not or cannot be appropriated by anyone (LMP 102). Serres draws a direct analogy 
between meaning and pollution when he claims that ‘by splashing about in this foul 
rubbish of meaning, we appropriate the world’ (B 166 [my translation]).
In all of these examples of appropriation through pollution, Serres insists on 
the continuities between the ‘natural’ and the ‘cultural’. There is no fundamental 
division between the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’, no original dichotomy between ‘desirable’ 
and ‘undesirable’ pollution (though such a distinction can of course be introduced 
later): ‘the spit soils the soup, the logo the object, the signature the page: property, 
propriety, or cleanness. The same word tells of the same struggle; in French, it has 
the same origin and the same meaning‘ (LMP 11; M 3). The dog that barks, the 
nightingale that sings, the deer that bellows, the hunter who sounds the horn, the 
lecherous voyeur who whistles at a woman, the company that buys advertising to 
brag about its products, the warring army, the writer, the perceiver of the world – 
each is seeking to extend its territory; everyone is urinating in the swimming 
pool (LMP 59; M 42).
It could well be objected that Serres is mixing apples and oranges: advertis-
ing and brand names are not threatening to destroy the earth; the circulation of 
money does not pose an immediate ecological danger; the chants of a football 
crowd do no physical harm; the chirping of songbirds precipitates no ecological 
crisis. So, why try to argue that they are manifestations of the same phenomenon? 
What is to be gained, practically speaking, by grouping all these disparate behav-
iours together under the banner of appropriation through pollution? The reply 
is quite simply that we cannot understand what motivates, or what is at stake in, 
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actions and behaviours which are ‘destroying the earth’ until we allow ourselves 
to see them in their non-atomised context. The desire to treat narrowly ecological 
questions without reference to any of these other phenomena is an instance of the 
partial thinking that insists on separating the ‘natural’ from the ‘cultural’, prevent-
ing us from asking the ‘why?’ behind the ‘how?’, and from discerning the links that 
would help us to understand – thus to respond to – ecological questions more ad-
equately. Serres laments that ‘we deal with pollution only in physical, quantitative 
terms, that is by means of the hard sciences. Well no, what is at stake here are our 
intentions, decisions and conventions. In short, our cultures’ (LMP 87–8; M 63). 
If we follow Serres in making these links across natural and cultural bound-
aries, we must acknowledge that polluting behaviour is an extension of patterns 
and ways of acting to be found in the ‘natural’ world, not something monstrously 
unnatural that threatens to destroy the pristine ‘natural’ patterns upon which it 
supervenes. It is important to note that for Serres ‘nature’ does not mean that 
which ‘given’ as opposed to artificial or constructed. In Rameaux [Palm Sunday] 
(2004), he explains: ‘how to define it? By its original sense: what was being born, 
what is born, what will be born; that is, a narrative of newborn events’ (R 134 [my 
translation]). Serres evokes birth as a figure of the new, as opposed to a linear con-
tinuation of a pre-existing story. That which is born departs from the predictable 
‘format’ to introduce a new chapter such as the emergence of life on Earth. Within 
this frame, we might reasonably conclude that pollution could constitute just as 
decisive an event in the narrative of the world – or of a particular ecosystem – as 
the emergence of life itself. By this definition, it is far from clear that pollution 
is unnatural; there is nothing more natural than pollution.29 The importance of 
this realisation is that, if true, the entire paradigm of ecology as ‘conservation’ 
and ‘protection’ is exposed as bankrupt, for it arbitrarily seeks to protect certain 
manifestations of the very same behaviours that it is militating to exclude. Ecology 
pursued on this basis undermines its own justification.
Practising general ecology
Serres’s exposure of the self-undermining nature of ecology as conservation leaves 
open the question of a more adequate ecological paradigm. In the light of Serres’s 
general ecology, we must strongly resist the mistaken notion that ‘nature’ is some-
thing ‘other’ to be protected. We must stop seeing pollution as a purely human 
destruction of a purely natural world. But what must we think and do instead? We 
29 I am grateful to Stephanie Posthumus for highlighting Serres’s insistence on under-
standing nature in terms of birth (naissance; naître).
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need better environmental imperatives than to protect and conserve, but what are 
they? What sort of ecology (in the narrow sense of the term) can arise if the very 
divisions between the natural and cultural, between the subject and the object, are 
contested? What imperatives can an ecology engender when birdsong, advertis-
ing, industrial pollution and money are considered to be manifestations of the 
same drive for appropriation through pollution? Serres has much to say on these 
questions, and the forthcoming section proposes to bridge the gap between the 
aforementioned principals of general ecology, and a specific, determined set of 
ecological practices. This bridge is tripartite, highlighting three important motifs 
in Serres’s thought that take us from the fact of general ecology to its behavioural 
and institutional outworking.
The world as fetish
The first important move in the practice of general ecology is to replace the artifi-
cial dyads of nature/culture and subject/object with the subtler notion of the fetish. 
Serres derives his notion of the fetish from Auguste Comte’s evocation of Earth 
as the Grande-Fétiche [Great Fetish] in Synthèse subjective [Subjective Synthesis] 
(1856), and he uses it to describe the current relation between humanity and the 
world, where a fetish is understood as an idol made by human hands that is in-
vested with a transcendent power (H 169). In the case of the world as fetish, the 
stakes are higher. It is not at all Serres’s claim that we invest the world with some 
spiritual or religious power, but that we depend upon the world: it is our condition 
of possibility. Nor is Serres suggesting that the world in its brute materiality is a 
human artefact. Such a patent falsity, he hastens to point out, was never the claim 
in relation to the fetish. Fetishists did not create the block of marble or the log of 
wood from which they carve their idols any more than we created rocks and the 
soil (P 269). When Serres says that the world is a fetish, he means that we depend 
upon it, it depends upon us (LCN 51),30 and we produce that which produces us. 
This change has a subtle but very important consequence: if we depend upon the 
things that depend upon us, the concept of ‘us’ itself is necessarily changed (RH 
141). Is it not just as appropriate, Serres wonders in L’Incandescent [The Incandes-
cent] (2003), to say ‘we are raining’ as ‘it is raining’?31 To whom or to what should 
we attribute the weather when culture is natural, and nature is cultural?
The strength of fetishism as a notion for comprehending our current relation to 
the habitable world is that it understands the fetish-maker and the fetish as both 
30 See also Michel Serres, Récits d’humanisme (Paris: Le Pommier, 2006), 138 [hereafter RH].
31 Michel Serres, L’Incandescent (Paris: Le Pommier, 2003), 338–9 [hereafter Inc].
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subject and object.32 In other words, humanity is changed by its new relation to 
the world just as much as the world itself is transformed. Having treated the world 
as an object, we find ourselves to be its objects,33 and we have also become our 
own fetishes, bringing about our own birth through the intermediary of the world 
that depends upon us: homo causa sui.34 Just like the natural world, the human 
is no longer (indeed, never was) something that is given, but rather something 
that is constructed by our thoughts and actions (Hom 24), as well as by the world 
upon which we depend: ‘we are our own ancestors, Adam and Eve, through the 
intermediary of the Earth and of life, which we mold almost at our leisure’.35 Our 
mastery of DNA and the atomic bomb put our birth and death in our hands, and 
having become our own handiwork we are no longer the same (P 204; see also 
R 40). Serres names this complex intertwining of dependency and agency natura 
sive homines (E 256; C 176).
Serres’s insistence on the world as fetish is related to, but goes beyond, the 
notion of the Anthropocene as defined by the Anthropocene Working Group36 
of the Subcommission on Quaternary Stratigraphy.37 The Anthropocene is – if a 
32 In this respect, it bears affinities with his notion of the quasi-object that is elaborated in 
Le Parasite and elsewhere. The quasi-object, Serres stresses, is also a quasi-subject, and 
fits comfortably into neither category (objectivity or subjectivity). The quasi-object is 
also a quasi-subject because it designates a subject that would not be a subject without 
it. Le Parasite, 302; The Parasite, trans. by L. R. Schehr (Minneapolis, MN: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2007), 225. When Serres evokes the relation between humanity 
and the world, he prefers Comte’s notion of fetishism, rather than the quasi-object. 
The fetish foregrounds the dialectic of creation (the created creates its creator) in a 
way that, while not necessarily absent from the quasi-object, is not emphasised. While 
it is conceivable for a quasi-object to be ‘natural’ and unmade, manufacture of some 
description is indispensable to the notion of the fetish.
33 Michel Serres, Hominescence (Paris: Le Pommier, 2001), 214 [hereafter Hom].
34 Michel Serres, ‘Le Temps humain: de l’évolution créatrice au créateur d’évolution’, in 
Qu’est-ce que l’humain?, ed. by P. Picq, M. Serres and J.-D. Vincent (Paris: Le Pommier, 
1999), 71–108 (107).
35 Michel Serres and Bruno Latour, Éclaircissements: cinq entretiens avec Bruno Latour 
(Paris: Bourin, 1992), 255 [hereafter E]; Conversations on Culture, Science and Time, trans. 
by R. Lapidus (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 176 [hereafter C].
36 Subcommission on Quaternary Stratigraphy, ‘Working Group on the ‘Anthropocene”’, 
quaternary.stratigraphy.org (23 February 2016), <http://quaternary.stratigraphy.org/
workinggroups/anthropocene> [accessed 27 May 2016].
37 Colin N. Waters, et al., ‘The Anthropocene Is Functionally and Stratigraphically Distinct 
from the Holocene’, Science 351.6269 (8 January 2016), <http://science.sciencemag.org/
content/351/6269/aad2622> [accessed 27 May 2016].
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little homophonous wordplay might be permitted – anthropocentric because it 
registers only one direction of influence: human beings are changing the earth 
and the climate. The idea of the fetish, by contrast, acknowledges the mutual influ-
ence of world and humanity on each other. Nor is Serres’s recuperation of Comte’s 
Grand-Fétiche to be confused with James Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis.38 The grave 
error of this latter hypothesis, Serres argues, is to treat the earth as a living entity, 
whereas life is defined by reproduction (P 278). The earth has no offspring, thus 
it is not alive. Serres considers that the intentionality and teleology ascribed to 
the world in the Gaia hypothesis is naive and unscientific – an opinion that he 
makes very clear in response to a direct question about Bruno Latour’s Gifford 
Lectures on ‘Facing Gaia’ (2013): ‘I recognise, of course, that the earth, considered 
as a whole, possesses certain characteristics of life – self-regulation, in particular – 
but that is where it stops. The earth does not evolve in the Darwinian sense of 
the term’ (P 274–5 [my translation]).39 Serres is a little hasty in his criticism of 
Latour, since the latter explicitly distances himself from Lovelock’s description 
of Gaia as a ‘living organism’,40 reading the ascription of life and intentionality to 
the planet as an analogue of Louis Pasteur’s hesitant granting of agency to bacte-
ria in Les Microbes organisés (1878). In ‘The Puzzling Face of a Secular Gaia’, the 
third of his Gifford lectures in Edinburgh (21 February 2013), Latour frames his 
acceptance of the agency of Gaia with the acknowledgment that ‘the philosophy 
of biology has never stopped borrowing its metaphors from the social realm’,41 
and he is explicit in stating that ‘it is not that Gaia is some “sentient being” but 
that the concept of “Gaia” captures the distributed intentionality of all the agents 
38 James Lovelock, The Ages of Gaia: A Biography of Our Living Earth (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988).
39 The fetish is conspicuously absent from Latour’s writings on ecological themes, in-
cluding the French version of his six Gifford lectures on ‘Facing Gaia’ (University of 
Edinburgh, 18–28 February 2013), in which Gaia is constructed not as a fetish but as 
a collective term for a distributed proliferation of agencies. ‘Facing Gaia: A New En-
quiry into Natural Religion’, University of Edinburgh (18–28 February 2013), <http://
www.ed.ac.uk/humanities-soc-sci/news-events/lectures/gifford-lectures/archive/se 
ries-2012-2013/bruno-latour> [accessed 27 May 2016]; Face à Gaïa: huit conférences 
sur le nouveau régime climatique (Paris: La Découverte, 2015).
40 Lovelock, The Ages of Gaia, xvi.
41 Bruno Latour, ‘The Puzzling Face of a Secular Gaia’, University of Edinburgh (21 Febru-
ary 2013), <http://www.ed.ac.uk/humanities-soc-sci/news-events/lectures/gifford-lec 
tures/archive/series-2012-2013/bruno-latour/lecture-three> [accessed 27 May 2016], 
34:41–7.
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that are modifying their surroundings to suit themselves better’.42 Latour is not 
suggesting that the Earth can reproduce itself, nor that we understand it as living 
in a straightforwardly biological sense. Though Serres’s criticism of Gaia rings 
true for Lovelock, it rings hollow for Latour.
Fetishism undermines the dichotomy between the given and the constructed, 
hence the artificial division between manipulation and conservation/protection. 
There can thus be no self-coherent minimalist or non-interventionist environ-
mentalism. To withdraw from the world is not to preserve its purity, naturalness 
or sacredness, but to draw an arbitrary line between some actions of appropriation 
through pollution, and others. Furthermore, there never was a nature that was free 
from the impositions and manipulations of culture because human culture is an 
excrescence of natural rhythms. 
Symbiosis
If the condition of the world as fetish means that it is no longer possible to try to 
‘conserve’ or ‘protect’, we must modulate the way in which we conceive our relation 
with the world, moving from a moribund host dying at the hands of its insatiable 
parasite to one of parasitic symbiosis. We must understand that the change of 
outlook that Serres is pressing on us is no trivial or obvious one. The paradigm 
of symbiosis stretches wide and deep, challenging some of our deep assumptions 
and predispositions. Serres argues in conversation with Latour that the approach 
of seeking to ‘cure’ or ‘eradicate’ cancer is misguided:
We must always reformulate this question: What is an enemy, who is he to us, and how 
must we deal with him? Another way to put it, for example, is: What is cancer? – a growing 
collection of malignant cells that we must at all costs expel, excise, reject? Or something 
like a parasite, with which we must negotiate a contract of symbiosis? I lean toward the 
second solution, as life itself does. (E 281; C 195)
Rather than seeking to eliminate cancer, Serres wagers, we will find a way to ‘profit 
from its dynamism’, to live with it in a parasitically symbiotic relation. Similarly, he 
warns that if we try to eradicate a microbe, it will mutate as many times as neces-
sary, and kill ten great-grandchildren of the child whom we inoculate against it 
(B 146). It would be better to seek to understand how it receives, stores, processes 
and emits information, in order to find a mutually beneficial symbiosis. Like all 
diplomacy, such an approach must begin by learning to speak the language of 
the other. 
42 Bruno Latour, ‘The Puzzling Face of a Secular Gaia’, 40:26–43.
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This example from pathology hopefully suffices to show that Serres’s symbio-
sis is not a ‘motherhood and apple pie’ response to the environmental crisis, and 
is no trivial or ‘common sense’ paradigm to embrace. It will doubtless raise the 
objection in the minds of some readers that symbiosis forecloses any possibility 
of radical, contestatory or disruptive politics. Does symbiosis mean that we are 
to find a way to live together with, say, racist ideologies and oppression? Where 
is the possibility for dissent in a system where we seek a way to live together with 
every enemy, however objectionable? Surely, are there not times when we need to 
oppose and eradicate? There are, indeed, and symbiosis radically undercuts such 
objectionable ideologies. To find out how this is the case, we need to turn to the 
third of the three Serresian motifs that will help us cross the bridge from general 
ecology to determinate ecological policy: the motif of cosmocracy.
From multinational democracy to global cosmocracy
On a collective level, the paradigm of parasitic symbiosis needs to be accompan-
ied by what Serres calls a new cosmocracy. The old politics was, as its etymol-
ogy suggests, an irreducibly urban affair at a time when the polis could rule the 
pagus as the subject to its object. Today, we no longer live in the same sort of 
city – one that can separate itself from the earth surrounding and sustaining 
it – and a new polis comes with the need for a new politics. One feature of the 
new politics offered by Serres is the end of relations of tribal belonging or group 
affiliation (appartenance), in favour of a double affirmation of universality and 
singularity. The old politics entailed a series of necessary affiliations – to family; 
to village and community; to nation – facilitated by the difficulty of connect-
ing over distance with people who do not share one’s affiliations. The political 
paradigm of this period was citizenship: affiliation to a particular, geographically 
determined collective with its own structures and laws. Today, Serres argues, 
affiliation is on the wane, and it has been overtaken by an increasingly aggressive 
affirmation of individuality, and a growing sense of the universal, of humanity as 
a whole beyond its local affiliations (P 229–30). It is a change facilitated by the 
triviality and ubiquity of information storage and retrieval, and by the ease of 
connecting almost any individual on the planet with any other in a virtual space 
that does not obey geometric boundaries (GM 165–6). This dual affirmation 
of individuality and university has come to fruition in the twentieth century, 
with the increased assertion of individual identity over corporate affiliation, 
and the increased awareness of humanity as a whole, as well as of the world as 
a contemplable whole. The new politics is not one of citizens or states, but of 
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individuals who know themselves to be part of humanity; not of the general, 
but of the singular and the universal.
The simultaneous emergence of a growing sense of human universality, and 
a growing individualistic resistance to group affiliations, opens the way for what 
Serres calls a new ‘cosmocracy’ – a political system that seeks to cultivate peace 
between humanity and the environment in the same way that current democra-
cies seek to preserve peace among the citizens of a nation (LMP 98). Cosmocracy 
is a political system in which not only human interests are represented (as in 
democracy) – a system that finds a way of formally incorporating the interests of 
non-human actors in the political process.43 Cosmocracy is a truly global politics, 
and Serres takes care to distinguish it from the current multinational system that 
obeys the old paradigm of affiliation. On a number of occasions, he recounts the 
time that he encountered Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the sixth Secretary-General of 
the United Nations (1992–6). Serres, asking about the possibility of the organisa-
tion performing the function of a world assembly, found himself corrected by 
the Egyptian diplomat: ‘it is not a “global assembly”; it is an “international as-
sembly” where each civil servant is present to defend the interests of his govern-
ment against the interests of the government facing him across the table. So, kiss 
goodbye to the world!’ (P 262 [my translation]). Boutros-Ghali could find no one 
to talk to him about air or water as such, for everyone responded that their role 
43 Serres’s cosmocracy bears close affinities to Bruno Latour’s ‘parlement des choses [par-
liament of things]’, an idea that can be traced in Latour’s work as far back as Nous 
n’avons jamais été modernes [We Have Never Been Modern] (1991). Bruno Latour, Nous 
n’avons jamais été modernes: essai d’anthropologie symétrique (Paris: La Découverte, 
1997), 197. An important distinction can be made between the two along the lines of 
the difference between Anglo-Saxon democratic politics and the French Republican 
model. Latour’s parliament of things is an extension of representative democracy: each 
human and non-human ‘concern’ receives political representation in the parliament. 
Serres’s emphasis, by contrast, is not on the communitarian notion of each interest 
group receiving its voice at the table, but on the commonality of all the members 
of the cosmocracy. It is precisely the sort of tribal belongings and group affiliations 
perpetuated (if not fostered) by Latour’s parliament of things that are challenged by 
the universalism of the Serresian cosmocracy: members of a cosmocracy do not seek 
representation for their particular lobby or set of concerns; their concern is for the 
whole. Serres’s twin prongs of individualism and universalism stand in contrast to 
Latour’s gathering of ‘concerns’, which remain instances of Serres’s unfavoured notion 
of appartenance. For a clarification of the difference between republicanism and de-
mocracy in this context, see Jules Régis Debray, ‘Êtes-vous démocrate ou républicain?’, 
Le Nouvel Observateur 1308 (30 November 1989), 115–21.
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was to represent the interests of their own government (EP 22). Serres concludes 
that there can never be an intergovernmental solution to environmental problems 
because the international system is based on affiliation, predisposing everybody 
to ignore global concerns (EP 22). The UN remains an institution of affiliations, 
resistant to the emergent twin values of individuality and universality.
Far from thwarting political engagement, the twin affirmation of individual-
ity and universality provides Serres with a powerful set of political tools. Let us 
consider the example of racist ideology that was raised as a potential objection to 
Serresian symbiosis at the end of the previous section. Racism is the very defini-
tion of an ideology of belonging (as opposed to one of universality), creating local 
groups of affiliation and setting them against each other in just the way that Serres 
condemns the multinationalism of the United Nations. Racism has no place in 
his cosmocracy. How does racism differ from the cancer with which Serres seeks 
to live in symbiosis? In the following way: the equivalence is not between cancer 
and racism, but between human death caused by cancer and racism. Serres does 
not argue, let us remember, that we should let cancer ravage the human popula-
tion on the basis that it has as much of a right to exist as we have. Symbiosis is 
not a laissez-faire policy of ‘live and let live’, but an intricate, high-stakes game of 
diplomacy that must serve the interests of both parties. Just as Serres’s symbiotic 
response to cancer is one in which it no longer kills people, but has its energy 
harvested in productive and beneficial ways, so a symbiotic response to the curse 
of racism would be to identify and redirect the lust for affiliation and domination 
that lies at its heart.
In place of the outdated assumptions and institutions that underlie the current 
resistance to a new politics, Serres offers at the end of L’Incandescent a thought-
experiment that he entitles ‘Appel aux universités pour un savoir commun’ [‘Call 
to Universities for a Common Knowledge’] (Inc 407–8), to which he appends the 
outline of a curriculum for the first year of university studies (Inc 409–10). The 
proposal is built on the twin observations that the hard sciences have attained a 
level of general acceptance transcending national affiliation (universality), and 
that world cultures form a mosaic tapestry of diverse forms and colours (in-
dividuality). It is important to point out that the suggestion is not to create an 
international monoculture, but to bring together the multicoloured Harlequin 
of culture and the monochrome Pierrot of the sciences in the same curriculum. 
Nor is Serres calling for the homogenisation of education, since one third of the 
curriculum in his plan for the first year remains dedicated to the individual stu-
dent’s speciality. The innovation of the curriculum is that it marries specialisation 
with the sort of cross-disciplinary training characteristic of Serres’s ‘tiers-instruit 
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[troubadour of knowledge]’ (GM 158) – a formation that would forestall the mu-
tual suspicion and rivalry between academic disciplines, which merely mimics 
the competition between national interests in current multinational institutions. 
It would, furthermore, be a global curriculum taught in academic institutions 
across the world – a feature that reflects the emergence of the new universality, 
replacing Neolithic affiliations. 
Only one who is educated in the sciences, humanities and arts can respond ad-
equately to an ecological crisis that knows no boundaries between the natural and 
the cultural. Only such an individual would be ready to embrace Serres’s proposal 
for a global (as opposed to multinational) institution – an assembly that he play-
fully names WAFLE (Water, Air, Fire, Life, Earth), at which non-human interests 
would be represented alongside those of humanity. Such an assembly is, Serres 
freely admits, a utopian proposal in the context of contemporary politics ruled by 
the logic of affiliation. But, taken together with his proposal for a new curriculum, 
it presents a concrete political vision that takes seriously the inextricability of 
nature and culture in general ecology, and the twin assertions of universality and 
individuality at the expense of local affiliations.
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University Press, 2015) examines the role of unpleasure in the work of directors 
such as Claire Denis, Lars von Trier, Gus Van Sant, Lucile Hadžihalilović, Brian de 
Palma, Bruno Dumont and Harmony Korine; Community, Myth and Recognition 
(Continuum, 2009) analyses different conceptualisations of community in texts by 
André Breton, Georges Bataille, Jean-Paul Sartre and Roland Barthes; Le Sacrifice 
de la sirène (Museum Tusculanum, 2003) considers the relation between poetry 
and politics in Stéphane Mallarmé’s writings.
Claire Nettleton (Pomona College) is a specialist in French decadent litera-
ture, animal studies, and the visual arts. She has published in Antennae (2013), 
Nineteenth-Century French Studies (2014), and a special issue of Dix-Neuf on 
ecopoetics (2015). Her book manuscript, adapted from her doctoral thesis at the 
University of Southern California, is entitled The Artist as Animal in Nineteenth-
Century France.
Jeff Persels is Associate Professor in the Department of Languages, Literatures 
and Cultures at the University of South Carolina. He has edited, co-edited and 
contributed to volumes on early modern scatology, theatre and ecocriticism, and 
authored a number of related articles. He is currently completing a book project 
on the ludic qualities of sixteenth-century French vernacular religious polemic.
Stephanie Posthumus is Assistant Professor in the Department of Languages, 
Literatures, and Cultures at McGill University. Working in the field of contem-
porary French literature, she has published numerous articles on philosophies 
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of nature and ecology, and on representations of landscapes, environments and 
non-human animals. Her book French ‘Écocritique’: Reading Contemporary French 
Fiction and Theory Ecologically is forthcoming with University of Toronto Press. 
With Louisa Mackenzie, she co-edited French Thinking about Animals (Michigan 
State University Press, 2015).
Karen Quandt (PhD Princeton University, 2011) is Assistant Professor of French 
in the Department of Languages, Literatures and Cultures at the University of 
Delaware. Aside from the aesthetics of landscapes and intersections between 
poetry, music and painting, she researches ecocritical approaches to nineteenth-
century French art and literature. She has published articles and book chapters on 
connections between Hugo and Delacroix, Lamartine and the art of poetry, Hugo 
and the ecogarden, and Baudelaire and pollution. She is working on a monograph 
about Victor Hugo and the poetry of nature.
Teo Sanz is a musicologist, Professor of French and Comparative Literature at the 
Universidad de Burgos, and Vice-President of AICL (Association Internationale 
de la Critique Littéraire). He is a member of EASLCE (European Association for 
the Study of Literature, Culture and Environment), GIECO (Grupo de Investi-
gación en Ecocrítica, Instituto Franklin-UAH) and SIEY (Société Internationale 
d’Études Yourcenariennes). His research chiefly focusses on ecocriticism, Mar-
guerite Yourcenar, and relations between music and literature. He is the author 
of Música y literatura (Universidad de Burgos, 1999) and Cómo leer a Marguerite 
Yourcenar (Júcar, 1991).
Dr Christopher Watkin is Senior Lecturer in French Studies at Monash Univer-
sity, Australia. His research interrogates fundamental positions and assumptions 
in contemporary French thought, including questions about God, humanity and 
philosophy. His most recent books are Difficult Atheism (Edinburgh University 
Press, 2011) and French Philosophy Today (Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 
and he has published articles on a range of recent and contemporary thinkers, 
including Alain Badiou, Roland Barthes, Jean-Luc Nancy, Quentin Meillassoux, 
Jacques Rancière, Paul Ricœur, and Michel Serres. He is currently completing the 
first comprehensive English-language introduction to Michel Serres’s thought 
and writing.
